assets controlled by foreign banks increased from 8% in 1994 to 56% in 1999. As of December 2000, foreign financial institutions controlled 38% of loans in the major countries of Latin America, up from 15% in 1996. In Asia, the numbers are less striking, but the trend is definitely visible. Foreign control in this region has increased from 2% to 13%. 1 Whether foreign bank participation will be beneficial for developing countries is controversial. Proponents argue that foreign banks bring new capital, improve management expertise, and promote efficient and competitive banking practices. Also, because foreign banks have access to alternative sources of funding other than local deposits, many claim that foreign bank participation may lead to lower volatility and higher growth of lending. In contrast, those opposing opening up of the financial systems to foreign ownership contend that foreign banks may decrease the stability of aggregate domestic bank credit by facilitating capital flight during crises and by increasing countries' exposure to regional contagion and to shocks in the home countries of foreign banks. Another common argument against foreign bank participation is that these institutions might "cherry pick" the most profitable and transparent customers, reducing financing to some sectors. One particular area of concern is the availability of credit to small businesses.
A number of recent studies have shown that foreign bank presence seems to improve banking system efficiency and to contribute to overall banking stability in developing countries.
2 On the other hand, the effect of foreign bank participation on access to credit in developing countries remains largely unexplored. This issue is the focus of this study. In particular, this paper investigates whether bank origin affects the share and growth of bank lending to small businesses. This question is important since small businesses account for a very significant percentage of total value added, and generate a large fraction of the total jobs in developing economies. 3 At the same time, banks are perceived as having a comparative advantage over other financial institutions in small business lending. Therefore, a reduction in bank lending to small businesses could have important negative real effects.
There are two sets of studies on small business lending that are relevant for this paper. First, there is a wide literature on bank lending to small businesses in the U.S. that may have implications for how the size of foreign banks and their mode of entry could affect lending to small businesses in developing countries. Second, there are a handful of studies on foreign bank lending to small businesses in developing countries, particularly focusing on Argentina. Both sets of studies have limitations. Conclusions from the U.S. literature should be drawn with caution since there are many differences between the U.S. and developing economies and because the focus of the U.S. literature is not on foreign bank lending to small businesses per se, but on small business lending in general. At the same time, the existing studies on foreign bank lending to small businesses in Argentina are few and yield mixed results. We review both sets of studies below before discussing the contributions of this paper.
U.S.-based studies on bank lending to small businesses indicate that large and organizationally complex institutions find it difficult to lend to informationally opaque small enterprises. 4 This literature is relevant to the study of the impact of bank origin on small business lending since, as shown by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) , foreign banks entering developing countries tend to be large.
On the other hand, recent U.S.-based studies argue that while large banks are unlikely to replicate the lending methods of small domestic banks, technological innovation could offer them an avenue for increasing small business lending. Mester (1997) contends that advances in credit scoring methodologies, coupled with enhanced computer power and increased data availability, are likely to change the nature of small business lending, making it increasingly possible for large banks to play an important role in this market. Furthermore, using survey data on whether and how large banks in the U.S. use small business credit scoring models, Berger, Frame, and Miller (2002) find that the adoption of these technologies is associated with expanded quantities of small business credits. 5 The literature on small business lending for the U.S. also indicates that the mode of bank entry may affect lending patterns to this sector. For example, evidence from the U.S. shows that de novo entrants seem to devote larger shares of their loan portfolios to small businesses relative to other banks. 6 The U.S. results are driven to a large extent by the fact that de novo entrants tend to remain small. However, these findings may not carry over to the case of foreign entry in developing countries, where most foreign banks setting up de novo operations are large international organizations that can increase their local presence very quickly (Focarelli and Pozzolo 2001) . Therefore, the impact of de novo foreign entry on small business lending in developing countries may differ from that documented for the U.S.
The U.S. evidence on the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on small business lending is mixed. Some U.S. studies find that M&As among small banks lead to an increased propensity to lend to small businesses following their consolidation. 7 However, when medium-sized and large banks are involved, a number of papers have reached conflicting conclusions. Keeton (1996) and Berger et al. (1998) find that M&As tend to result in a reduction in small business lending when large banks are involved, but Strahan and Weston (1998) find no significant change in the ratio of small business loans to assets, following M&As between large banks.
To date, most of the M&As between foreign and domestic banks in developing countries have involved the union of large banks. Thus, a priori, based on U.S. studies of M&As among large banks, we might expect to find a decline in foreign bank lending to small businesses as a result of consolidation involving foreign banks. However, it is possible that credit to small businesses might increase following M& As if foreign banks view these transactions as a way of getting inside knowledge on the sector and expertise on how to lend to small businesses through the acquisition of domestic banks that already have this know-how.
As mentioned above, the literature on foreign bank lending to small businesses in developing countries is very limited. In fact, Argentina is the only such country for which we could find studies on this topic. However, these studies are few in number, are largely based on comparisons of foreign and domestic banks lending ratios to small businesses without controlling for other factors that might explain the share of lending to this sector, and yield mixed results.
For example, Bleger and Rozenwurcel (2000) indicate that foreign bank participation in Argentina was associated with a reduction in bank lending to small businesses from around 20% to 16% of total lending between 1996 and 1998. In contrast, Escudé et al. (2001) find that despite their lower tendency to lend to small businesses, foreign banks increased both their propensity and their market share of lending to the sector between 1998 and 2000. Both studies examine the distribution of foreign and domestic bank lending by loan size, without taking into account factors other than bank origin that could affect their analysis of lending ratios. Finally, using a rich dataset on Argentinean business debtors in December 1998, Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001) find that large banks and foreign-owned banks are less inclined to extend credit to smaller firms. A potential limitation of this study is that the authors run separate models for the probability that a small business receives a loan from a large bank and the probability of receiving a loan from a foreign bank, making it difficult to assess whether it is bank size or foreign ownership that limits access for small borrowers. Furthermore, the paper does not control for other bank characteristics that might also affect the propensity to lend to small businesses. Finally, the evidence is only for one period, December 1998.
Given the paucity and the limitations of the existing research on the impact of foreign bank participation on small business lending and due to the importance of this issue from a policy standpoint, further work is clearly warranted. We view this paper as a first step in this direction. Using bank-level data for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru during the late 1990s, this study empirically investigates whether bank origin affects the share and growth rate of bank lending to small businesses, while controlling for other bank characteristics that might influence these variables (including the type of foreign bank entry). After Eastern Europe, Latin America has been the region that most rapidly and widely allowed foreign bank entry. Moreover, our study focuses on four of the most important countries in the region that have witnessed the largest increase in foreign bank participation in recent years.
While we find that, on average, foreign banks tend to lend less to small businesses than their domestic counterparts, our results reveal an important asymmetry in the behavior of small and large foreign banks. In a number of instances, primarily for Argentina and Chile, we find that large foreign banks surpass large domestic banks in terms of the share and growth rate of lending to small businesses. Consequently, our results suggest that the size of the local operations of foreign banks is an important determinant of the extent to which these banks will discriminate against small businesses. Countries that allow foreign bank participation and wish to promote bank lending to small businesses should pursue policies that encourage foreign banks to increase the size of their local operations in the country by taking steps such as improving the quality of the contracting environment, providing access to good borrower data, and promoting macroeconomic stability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data used in this study. Section 2 explains the econometric methodology. Section 3 presents the main regression results. Section 4 reports on a number of additional estimations conducted to verify the robustness of our main results. Section 5 presents a preliminary exploration of the cross-country differences in the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
DATA DESCRIPTION
To analyze domestic and foreign bank lending to small businesses in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru during the late 1990s, we assembled a comprehensive bank-level dataset that includes information on banks' lending portfolio, performance, size, origin (domestic or foreign), consolidation activity, and mode of foreign bank entry. The main sources of data for each country were the corresponding bank superintendencies. Table 1 provides the definition, frequency, and mean of all variables used in our analysis. Below, we describe in more detail the data we gathered on small business lending, bank origin, consolidation activity, and mode of foreign bank entry, since this information is quite central and unique to our analysis.
Lending to Small Businesses
Given the objective of this study, the most important information needed was data on bank loans to small businesses. What constitutes a loan to a small business varies across countries. In each case, we followed the criteria used or suggested by the corresponding Superintendency or Central Bank. In Argentina, a Central Bank study on small business lending conducted before the recent devaluation indicated that small businesses had total debt between $50,000 and $2.5 million (see Escudé et al. 2001) . However, since information on total debt was not available, we used bank-level information on total lending stratified by loan size. According to the aforementioned study, small businesses with less than U.S.$2.5 million in debt, borrowed, on average, up to U.S.$1 million from any individual bank. Thus, we defined lending to small businesses as all loans up to this amount, using data from 1998 to 2000.
For Chile, small business loans were identified based on the total debt of the business rather than the size of individual loans. The Chilean Banking dollars; Chile: loans to businesses with less than 1.5 million U.S. dollars in debt; Colombia: loans to small businesses with less than 1.7 million U.S. dollars in assets; Peru: loans for less than 0.5 million U.S. dollars.
b "All banks" indicates that the variable is defined for domestic and foreign banks within the sample.
Superintendency measures total debt in "unidades de fomento" (UF), which are equal to a fixed quantity of Chilean pesos indexed to inflation. Following the guidelines provided by the Superintendency, we defined small business lending as loans to borrowers with less than UF 50,000 (about U.S.$1.5 million) in total debt.
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Officials from the Peruvian Banking Superintendency estimate that small business loans range between U.S.$20,000 and $500,000. Thus, using a breakdown of bank lending prepared by the Peruvian Banking Superintendency, we defined small business credits as loans to businesses up to this amount.
The Superintendency of Banks in Colombia requires banks to keep a separate record of loans to small firms with assets of less than U.S.$1.7 million registered with the Superintendency of Businesses. For each bank in Colombia, we obtained quarterly information between 1997 and 1999 on loans to the 4067 small businesses that were registered.
While the average ratio of lending to small businesses ranges between 21% and 27% for Argentina, Chile, and Peru, it does not exceed 2% in Colombia (see Table 1 ). This might be because data on small business lending in Colombia were available only for those firms registered with the Superintendency of Businesses. Thus, while it seems acceptable to compare the share of small business loans for foreign and domestic banks in Colombia, it might not be appropriate to contrast small business lending shares in Colombia with those in the remaining countries.
Differences across countries in the share of small business loans might also reflect the relative abilities of companies to access outside sources of finance, particularly international capital markets. 9 To the extent that the largest firms in a country are able to access foreign bond and equity markets, or receive syndicated loans from banks outside the country, they will rely less on bank loans from their home country. Small businesses would, therefore, account for a higher share of in-country bank loans. Because cross-country comparisons of small business lending shares are susceptible to measurement problems of the sort described above, we focus primarily on within-country evaluations of lending by foreign and domestic banks.
Bank Origin and Foreign Bank Participation
Together with the data on bank lending to small businesses, we also gathered information on bank origin (foreign or domestic), classifying a bank as foreign if it was at least 50% foreign-owned. In Colombia, 40% of banks (out of a total of 27 institutions) were foreign-owned, although they were responsible for only about one-quarter of banking sector loans during the late 1990s. In Peru, over half of the banks (out of 19) were foreign-owned. Foreign-owned banks accounted for about a quarter of lending for most of the period, although this increased to 40% by the end of the period.
Foreign-owned banks were more important in Argentina and Chile-by the end of the 1990s, they held over 50% of Argentina's banking sector loans and almost 8. We also have data on lending to borrowers with less than UF 10,000 (roughly $300,000) and less than UF 200,000 (roughly $6 million) in total debt. Results are robust to these alternative definitions.
9. We thank an anonymous referee for this insight.
45% of Chile's. 10 Whereas, the share held by foreign banks climbed throughout our sample period in Chile, most of that growth occurred prior to our sample period in Argentina. In part, this is because the sample period is shorter for Argentina due to availability of data on lending to small businesses.
Consolidation Activity and Mode of Foreign Bank Entry
The corresponding Bank Superintendencies also provided us with information on all merger and acquisition activity in each country over the relevant sample periods. In particular, we obtained information on the transactions involving foreign banks. Finally, we identified those foreign banks that initiated de novo operations in each country.
Although consolidation was important in all four countries, it was most dramatic in Argentina, where the number of financial institutions fell by over half, from over 200 to fewer than 100, between 1990 and late 2000. While several banks failed over this period, many were involved in mergers and acquisitions. In the period covered by our data (June 1998 to March 2000 , there were 28 mergers and acquisitions, 15 involving foreign banks.
11 Although Argentina experienced the most mergers and acquisitions in the late 1990s, Chile, Colombia, and Peru also underwent considerable consolidation. Chile had 11 such transactions, half involving foreign banks. In Colombia and Peru, there were fewer cases of consolidation: six mergers and acquisitions, two of which involved foreign banks. De novo foreign entry was relatively limited within our sample. There were only six such cases in Argentina and two in Peru.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Our empirical analysis of the impact of bank origin on small business lending focuses on both the share and growth of lending to this sector. If lending to small businesses grows at a slower pace than other types of lending, it is possible that the share of lending to this sector could be dropping, while the growth rate of the level could still be positive. Thus, it is important to examine both of these variables to get a clear sense for how bank origin affects small business lending.
We model the ratio of small business loans to total loans and the growth rate of lending to small businesses as a function of a number of bank indicators, including bank origin. In particular, to assess whether foreign and domestic banks have different lending patterns, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is over 50% owned by foreign interests. We also control for the size of the bank using its total 10. There were 37 foreign banks (out of 91 institutions) operating in Argentina by the late 1990s and 18 (out of 28) in the case of Chile.
11. Due to missing balance sheet or income statement data, it is possible that not all banks that took part in these transactions are included in our regressions. The period between the Tequila Crisis in late 1994 and the beginning of our sample witnessed even greater consolidation in Argentina (see World Bank 1998).
assets at the start of the period. 12, 13 By interacting these variables, we allow size to affect bank lending to small businesses differently for domestic and foreign banks.
In most countries in our sample, there are three kinds of foreign banks: those that had been operating in the country for a number of years before our sample begins (e.g., Citibank in all four countries); de novo foreign banks that started up their business at some point in the sample; and banks that, within our sample, acquired or merged with other domestic or foreign banks. As noted in the literature, there are reasons to expect that these types of banks might behave differently towards small businesses. For example, in the U.S. literature, de novo banks appear to be more apt to lend to small businesses than other foreign banks, while consolidation among large banks has resulted in lower shares of small business lending. We note, however, that de novo banks in the U.S. tend to remain small and thus are constrained to make small loans due to borrower concentration limits. In developing countries, where banking sectors tend to be less competitive, a large multinational bank could enter and grow quickly, and thus might rely less on lending to small businesses.
14 To allow for differences in the impact that the mode of entry by foreign banks has on the share of lending to small businesses, we include separate dummies for foreign de novo banks and for those cases when foreign banks entered the system or increased in size by acquiring domestic institutions. 15, 16 These dummy variables are also interacted with a variable measuring the time since entry or acquisition to capture changes in banks' small business lending as they became better established in the market.
Because consolidation by domestic banks or among foreign banks could affect the share of small business lending, we include a dummy to capture this type of transactions. We also interact this variable with the time since merger or acquisition to control for the dynamic impact of bank consolidation (independent of ownership) on lending to small businesses.
12. We use the initial value of size (measured as the log of assets at the start of the period) to avoid any potential endogeneity between size and the dependent variables (share and growth of small business lending).
13. In regressions not reported here, we included each bank's market share and number of branches. These variables were highly collinear with total assets, making it difficult to interpret our results. DeYoung, Goldberg, and White (1999) also find that the number of branches is not a significant determinant of small business lending when also controlling for size.
14. We thank an anonymous referee for this interpretation. 15. For the case of Argentina, where consolidation was more prevalent, we are able to distinguish between cases where a foreign bank that was not operating previously in the country entered by acquiring a domestic bank (transactions which we refer to as foreign purchases) from cases when an already existing foreign bank acquired and merged with a domestic bank (transactions which we label foreign M&As).
16. An acquisition can occur in the absence of a merger and a merger can occur in the absence of an acquisition. Thus, in principle, it would be interesting to distinguish between acquisitions without mergers, mergers of affiliates (i.e., without an acquisition), and acquisitions with merger. However, within our sample, there are already too few transactions involving mergers and acquisitions to be able to disaggregate them any further, especially considering that we are already separating out those involving a foreign and a domestic bank. After consulting with the bank superintendencies of the countries in our sample, we are reasonably certain that there are no acquisitions by foreign banks that were already present in a country that did not eventually result in a merger. Therefore, our sample contains cases where (1) a foreign bank entered a market by acquiring an existing domestic bank, or (2) a foreign bank, already present, expanded its operations by acquiring a domestic bank and then merging its operations with those of the acquired bank.
Publicly owned banks operate in three of the four countries in our sample (Argentina, Chile, and Colombia). Because lending decisions at government-owned banks could be driven by politics or special mandates rather than by commercial factors, we include a dummy for public banks in our estimation.
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As bank-level controls, we also include the initial value of two financial strength and performance indicators, return on assets and the ratio of administrative expenses to total assets. As in the case of bank size, initial values of the variables mentioned are used to avoid any potential endogeneity between them and the dependent variables. In some specifications, we also include the initial value of equity capital over total assets and of the share of non-performing loans. These variables are defined for domestic and foreign banks alike. The expected signs on all of these performance variables are unclear. For example, banks with positive return on assets and a higher degree of capitalization might be better able to grow over time and to expand into areas where it takes time and effort to acquire the know-how of the business, like lending to small borrowers. At the same time, banks with low return on assets, a high share of non-performing loans, and low equity capital might be more willing to "gamble for resurrection" by venturing into higher risk segments like lending to small businesses. Banks with higher ratios of administrative expenses to assets might be better suited to lend to small businesses, if their high expenses are associated with a more extensive branch network and a larger labor force that can provide the personalized attention and monitoring that is often needed when lending to small businesses. On the other hand, banks with high administrative expenses might be at a disadvantage in competing with other banks in lending to small businesses.
Finally, the regressions include year dummies to control for changes in the share of lending to small businesses associated with macroeconomic variables or any other factors that are common among banks over time.
In summary, for each country, we estimate Equation (1) below in order to examine the impact of bank origin on the share of lending to small businesses, controlling for other factors mentioned above that might influence this ratio.
17. Public banks in Argentina, Colombia, and Chile account for 30%, 25%, and 10% of banking assets, respectively. where j: 1...X is the country identifier, i: 1... N captures each individual bank within a country, t: 1... T refers to the time period, P: is the proportion of total loans lent to small businesses (as defined in country j) by local bank i in country j, at time t, SIZE: is the log of real initial assets of bank i in country j, 18, 19 FOREIGN: is a dummy variable that equals 1 if local bank i in country j is over 50% owned by foreign interests, STRENGTH: is a vector of variables measuring bank performance, including initial values for return on assets, the ratio of administrative expenses to total assets, equity capital over total assets, and the share of non-performing loans for bank i in country j, 20 PUBLIC: is a dummy variable that equals 1 if local bank i in country j is over 50% owned by the government, YEAR: is a set of dummy variables for each year in the sample, FOREIGN DE NOVO: is a dummy variable that equals 1 if majority-foreign-owned bank i entered country j by setting up de novo operations (i.e., not through merger with or acquisition of a domestic bank), FOREIGN M&A: is a dummy variable that equals 1 in cases when a majorityforeign-owned bank i entered country j or increased the size of its operations by merging with or acquiring a domestic bank. This variable is 0 in the absence of such transactions or before they occur, 21, 22 FOREIGN PURCH: is a dummy variable that equals 1 in cases when a majorityforeign-owned bank i (previously not operating in the country) entered country j by purchasing a domestic bank. This variable is 0 in the absence of such transactions or before they occur, 23 18. This variable is constructed using data from one period before the start of our sample for small business lending in each country. That is, we use size data from period 0, while the regressions use data from period 1,…, T. We do this to avoid any potential simultaneity problems for the first period of data.
19. In addition to this model specification, we also experimented with including squared size, and squared size interacted with the bank origin dummy. In practice, the squared terms were jointly insignificant in most cases. Further, in the one case where they were statistically significant, the results were qualitatively similar to the results with only a linear term for size.
20. Like we do with initial size, we lag these variables one period to avoid the potential simultaneity between these variables and the first observation of the share of small business lending for each bank (see Note 18).
21. For example, in Argentina, Lloyds Bank (an existing British bank) acquired and merged with Banco Tres Arroyos (a domestic bank). Lloyds continued to exist after this transaction, but Banco Tres Arroyos disappeared as a separate entity. In this case, FOREIGN M&A takes a value of 1 for Lloyds following the M&A and 0 prior to this transaction. Similarly, Santander (a Spanish bank operating in Argentina) acquired and merged with Banco Rio (an Argentinean bank). In this case, the new bank continued to exist under the name of Rio and Santander disappeared as a separate institution, so FOREIGN M&A, in this case, is 1 for Rio after this transaction, and 0 prior to this transaction.
22. See Note 16. 23. This variable is only defined for Argentina, where we have enough transactions to distinguish between acquisitions by foreign banks already in the country and those cases when the acquirer was not previously operating in the country.
OTHER M&A: is a dummy variable that equals 1 for mergers and acquisitions that did not involve a majority foreign-owned bank merging with or acquiring a domestic institution. This variable is 0 in the absence of such transactions or before they occur, 24 AGE: time since a merger, acquisition, or de novo entry; measured in fractions of a year.
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Following Berger et al. (1998) , Equation (1) is estimated in log-odds logit form. 26 The error terms in Equation (1) are likely to be correlated for observations from the same bank. This could lead us to underestimate the size of the standard errors on coefficients, and hence overestimate t-statistics (see, for example, Moulton 1986 ). To take account of this, we use Huber-White robust standard errors, allowing error terms to be correlated across observations for the same bank (i.e., we allow for clustered standard errors). 27 Equation (2) examines the impact of bank origin on the growth rate of real lending to small businesses, again allowing for the possibility that the impact of size might depend on bank origin.
Once again, j ϭ 1...X is the country identifier, i ϭ 1...N captures each individual bank within a country, and t ϭ 1...T refers to the time period. Most regressors are defined as above. The growth in small business lending (SBLGROWTH) for a given period is calculated relative to its level at the end of the preceding period. Since both of those levels must be available to calculate a growth rate, this means that there are fewer observations in the growth rate regressions than there are in the share regressions. To eliminate seasonal variation in the growth rates, we include a set of seasonal dummies (quarterly or half-yearly depending on the frequency of the data) in the regressions. As before, we allow for clustered standard errors in our estimations. 24 . In other words, this dummy controls for mergers and acquisitions between two (or more) domestic or two (or more) foreign banks.
25. For example, in Argentina where data are quarterly, age would equal 0.25 one-quarter after a merger, acquisition, or de novo entry.
26. Focusing on the log-odds ratio rather than the share gets around the problem that shares are bounded between 0 and 1. In practice, results were similar when we used simple shares.
27. See Deaton (1997, pp. 73-78) for a detailed discussion of clustering. Also, see Huber (1967) and Rogers (1993) .
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Below, we report regression results on the determinants of the share and growth of lending to small businesses in each of the four countries in our sample, over the late 1990s. Also, based on these regression results, we present simulations to compare specifically the share and growth rate of small business lending by large and small foreign and domestic banks. Table 2 reports results from the share regressions as described in Equation (1). Given our interest in exploring the impact of bank origin on small business lending, the key variable from these regressions is the foreign ownership dummy. This variable is negative in most cases, but significant only for Chile and for one model for Peru (model 2.13). Therefore, controlling for other factors, it appears that a typical foreign bank did not devote a significantly lower share of its lending to small businesses in Argentina and Colombia during our sample period. In the models for Chile and Peru, where the foreign ownership dummy is negative and significant, the interaction between bank size and foreign ownership is significant and positive, suggesting that small domestic banks devoted a larger share of their lending to small businesses than small foreign banks. However, as bank size increases, the disparity between domestic and foreign banks declines. In fact, for Chile, our models indicate that large foreign banks devoted a higher share of lending to small businesses than large domestic banks (see Table 3 ).
Share Regressions
By itself, size has a negative impact on lending to small businesses. This effect is significant only in the case of Peru and one model for Colombia (model 2.10). Private domestic banks generally appear to lend more to small businesses (as a share of total lending) than state-owned banks, after controlling for other factors that might affect lending. The coefficient on the dummy indicating government ownership is negative and statistically significant in the regressions for Argentina (models 2.1 and 2.2) and Chile (models 2.5 and 2.6). In Colombia, the only other country with state-owned banks, the coefficient is positive in one specification, negative in another. One frequently heard justification for state banks is that they resolve credit market failures by emphasizing lending to small businesses. These results appear to undercut that justification.
Among the variables controlling for bank strength and performance, we do not find any consistent patterns across countries. Administrative expenses are positive and significant in the share regressions for Argentina, but negative and significant in the case of Peru. Non-performing loans are only positive and significant in the case of Argentina, while the ratio of equity over assets exhibits a similar behavior only in the case of Chile.
Finally, the regressions also include a series of dummies to control for the effects of mergers, acquisitions, purchases of existing domestic banks by new foreign entrants, and de novo entry by foreign banks. These variables are included to control for the possibility that banks involved in some form of consolidation within our sample and those that have only recently entered the system might experience a sudden jump in their share of lending to small businesses, and it might take them some time to reach their desired portfolio allocations. To allow banks to slowly adjust their portfolio shares, variables representing the time since the consolidation or entry are also included. In Argentina, where the largest number of transactions took place, we are able to include more dummies than in the other countries. However, since there were very few instances of consolidation or entry during our sample period in most of the countries, and because some observations are lost due to missing or incomplete data, the coefficient estimates are often based on only a few observations. Consequently, these variables might be best thought of as controlling for temporary disequilibria following consolidation and new entry, and results for them should be interpreted with caution. Given the limited number of observations, it is not surprising that the consolidation/entry variables do not tell a consistent story across countries. We briefly mention some of the results for these variables. First, the very limited evidence on de novo entry, which comes only from Argentina, appears to indicate that contrary to the U.S. experience, foreign de novo entrants do not concentrate on small business financing. The coefficient on the de novo entrant dummy is negative and statistically insignificant in the share regressions, but positive and statistically significant in one of the growth regressions. This suggests that although de novo foreign banks lent less to small businesses as a share of their lending, growth was faster for these banks. Second, the FOREIGN PURCHASE dummy (which controls for cases where an outside foreign bank purchases a domestic bank) is positive and significant in the Argentina share regressions, indicating that some foreign banks entered that market by purchasing domestic banks that devoted a high share of their lending to small businesses. The rest of the merger/entry variables show little consistency across types of regression or across countries. For example, the coefficient for FOREIGN M&A (i.e., cases of existing foreign banks acquiring or merging with domestic banks) is negative and significant for one model for Chile (model 2.6), but insignificant for those of Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. The interaction between FOREIGN M&A and AGE is insignificant for Argentina and Colombia, negative and significant for one specification for Chile, and positive and significant for Peru. Similar inconsistencies across countries are found for all the regression types discussed below. The effect of the mode of entry on the lending behavior of foreign banks is an important topic. We simply lack the number of observations necessary to provide consistent evidence on this issue. 
Growth Regressions
Table 2 also includes regressions based on Equation (2), with quarterly or halfyearly growth of small business lending as the dependent variable. 29 The coefficient on the dummy indicating foreign ownership is negative and statistically significant in the regressions for Argentina and one specification for Chile (model 2.8). For Colombia and Peru, this variable is insignificant. Controlling for other factors, the growth rate of lending to small businesses for the typical foreign bank in those two countries was similar to that for domestic banks. The statistically insignificant coefficient on the interaction term between size and foreign origin for both Colombia and Peru suggests that size affected growth of small business lending similarly for foreign and domestically owned banks in these countries.
In the specifications for Argentina and Chile, where the foreign ownership dummy is negative and significant, the interaction between foreign ownership and bank size is positive and significant. As in the share regressions, this suggests that small business lending growth at small domestic banks was higher than at small foreign banks, but for larger banks, the disparity between domestic and foreign banks was much smaller. In fact, for both countries, our models indicate that large foreign banks experienced higher growth in lending to small businesses than large domestic banks (see Table 3 ).
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The coefficients on the dummy variable for public banks in the growth regressions are mostly statistically insignificant. In one of the two regressions for Chile (model 2.7), the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, indicating that lending to small businesses by government-owned banks was growing at a slower pace than lending by private domestically owned banks. The results provide further 28. Again, part of this stems from the short time period covered and the low number of banks, and part stems from our inability to combine the respective country datasets as described above.
29. In the growth rate regressions, observations are omitted for the period following a merger or acquisition to prevent such transactions from unduly affecting results. For example, an acquisition and merger that doubles the size of a bank will result in abnormally large growth rates in the period after this transaction, even if the resulting larger bank makes no new loans over this period.
30. These results for Argentina could still be consistent with those obtained by Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001) , since their estimations focus only on December 1998, a period towards the start of our sample and our results are significant for the growth of lending rather than the share of lending, which is most similar to their dependent variable.
indication that public banks do not necessarily outperform private banks with respect to small business lending.
The bank characteristics and performance variables are rarely significant and often have different signs across countries in the growth rate regressions. Bank size, for example, is insignificant in all specifications except one (model 2.16 for Peru). Administrative expenses are positive and significant for Argentina and one specification for Peru (model 2.16), but not for Chile or Colombia. Similarly, the coefficients on return on assets are statistically insignificant in the regressions for Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, negative and statistically significant for one of the regressions for Chile (model 2.8). Non-performing loans have a negative impact on the growth of lending in Chile and Peru, but are insignificant for Argentina and Colombia. Equity over assets, on the other hand, has a positive impact on the growth of lending for Argentina and Chile only.
The small business lending by foreign banks in Colombia and Peru may have been qualitatively different than that undertaken by large foreign banks in Argentina and Chile, but we do find evidence from the loan growth regressions from all four countries that suggests that foreign banks (or a subset of them) were expanding such lending at least as fast as both private domestic and public banks during this period. These results appear to undercut claims that foreign banks are unable or unwilling to lend to small businesses in developing countries.
Simulations
The positive and significant coefficient for the foreign bank/size interaction term in some specifications indicates that large foreign banks in some countries were more likely to lend to small business than small foreign banks. However, based on that coefficient alone, it is not clear whether large foreign banks lent more to small businesses than large domestic banks, nor is it easy to gauge how much more small domestic banks lent to small businesses than small foreign banks. To answer these questions, Table 3 presents predicted shares and growth rates of lending to small businesses for foreign and domestic banks. Estimates are calculated in the final period for each country, for banks of different sizes using coefficients in Table 2 and the mean values of continuous variables (other than size) for banks of that type. We use the specifications that control for equity over assets and non-performing loans (models 2.2, 2.6, 2.10, and 2.14 for shares; models 2.4, 2.8, 2.12, and 2.16 for growth rates). Shares and growth rates are calculated for banks at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles based on size. For these simulations, we assume also that local banks were not involved in any mergers or acquisitions, and were not de novo entrants.
For all four countries, medium and large domestic banks lend less to small businesses (as a share of total lending) than small domestic banks. The pattern for foreign-owned banks appears quite different from that observed for domestic banks. Foreign banks with a small local presence lend considerably less to small businesses than small domestic banks in all four countries. This pattern does not hold, however, for large foreign banks. In fact, in Chile and Colombia, large foreign banks lend relatively more to small businesses than similar domestic banks do. In Peru, although foreign banks of all sizes lend lower shares than similar domestic banks, the difference is smaller for large banks than it is for small banks. In Argentina, foreign banks of all sizes also lend lower shares than similar domestic banks, and the gap between the two remains roughly constant as size increases. However, only the estimates for Chile are derived from a model in which the foreign ownership dummy and the foreign ownership/size interaction term are both significant. Table 3 also shows the estimated growth in lending to small businesses for foreign and domestic banks of different sizes. In all four countries, estimated growth rates for the largest foreign banks (based on assets of their local operations) are higher than for the largest domestic banks. The results from the specifications for Argentina and Chile are more reliable because both the foreign ownership dummy and the foreign ownership/size interaction term are significant.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To verify the robustness of our main results, we ran additional regressions (1) controlling for the size of the parent foreign banks; (2) allowing for foreign banks from countries with cultural affinity to those in our sample to exhibit different lending patterns than other foreign banks; and (3) directly incorporating the impact of fixed effects. We summarize the results from these robustness checks below.
Parent Bank Size
Our results, so far, controlled for foreign bank size using the total assets of their local operations. However, for multinational bank subsidiaries or branch operations, the size and the complexity of the parent bank (or bank holding company) might be more indicative of overall financial strength and technological and management expertise. Foreign banks might rely on this expertise to lend to small businesses. Table 4 presents regression results that control for the assets of the parent bank to help determine whether its local presence or the size of its global operations make a foreign bank more (or less) likely to engage in small business lending. Data on foreign banks' parent size come from Fitch-IBCA's Bankscope database.
Our results indicate that foreign banks with a large local presence have a higher propensity to lend to small businesses. On the other hand, the coefficient on parent bank assets is negative in the share regressions for all four countries, but is only consistently significant in the case of Argentina. The coefficient on parent bank size is significant in only one of the growth regressions (model 4.8 for Chile).
Appendix Table A1 shows the roster of foreign banks operating in each country along with the country of origin, the size of the local operations, the assets of the parent banks, and the average share and growth of lending to small businesses. As can be seen from this table, the majority of the banks operating in Latin America are internationally renowned institutions that are likely to possess the technology to lend to whatever sectors they choose to, including small businesses. However, appears that what matters for small business lending might not be whether the foreign bank possesses the technology to target this sector, but whether it also has the commitment or local presence to put it to use in the host markets it enters.
Banks from Spanish Speaking Countries
Due to cultural affinities such as a shared language, banks from some countries might have advantages over others in lending to small businesses in the four countries that we study. To test that proposition, we add to our base specifications a dummy variable equal to one for all banks from countries whose native language is Spanish or Portuguese (TABLE 5) . 31 In practice, this includes all banks from Latin America and Spain. In the share regressions, the coefficient on the Spanish dummy is positive and significant in one specification for Argentina (model 5.2) and Chile (model 5.5). In all other share regressions and all growth rate regressions, the variable is not significant. On the whole, the evidence does not strongly favor the cultural affinity hypothesis. This suggests that perhaps banks from nonSpanish speaking countries can hire the local talent required to bridge gaps due to language or culture. Most importantly, our main results regarding foreign ownership and the interaction between bank size and foreign ownership are robust to the inclusion of the Spanish language dummy variable.
Fixed Effects Estimation
Despite our best efforts to include sufficient bank-level controls in our regressions to isolate the impact of bank origin on lending to small businesses, the coefficient estimates might still suffer from omitted variables bias. In other contexts, the inclusion of bank-specific fixed effects would resolve this problem. In our case, the variable of primary interest, foreign ownership, and other bank characteristics measured at the start of the sample (e.g., return on assets, administrative expenses, and size) do not change for most banks during the sample period. As a result, it is not possible to allow for fixed effects, while including these variables in the regressions.
32
To get around this problem, and as a final robustness check on our main results, we use a two-step estimation procedure. 33 In the first stage, we regress the share (or growth rate) of lending to small businesses on all variables that change for any 31 . In principle, we would like to control for differences in bank nationality at the most disaggregated level (i.e., including separate bank dummies for each country of origin). However, as can be seen from Table A1 , in the countries we study, there are at most two or three foreign banks with the same nationality, making it difficult to control for cultural affinity at this level of detail.
32. In the base share and growth regressions discussed so far, we controlled for unexplained banklevel effects by allowing for clustered standard errors by bank.
33. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this technique.
bank over the sample period and on a dummy variable for each bank (i.e., bank fixed effects). The first stage regressors include year dummies, seasonal dummies, the public ownership dummy (because some banks were privatized in Argentina), and the merger/acquisition variables. We use the fixed effects estimated in the first stage as the dependent variable in the second stage regression. Explanatory variables include all those that do not change over the sample period (foreign ownership, initial size, and initial performance). For Chile and Colombia, where there were no privatizations, the public bank dummy is included in the second stage.
Results from the second stage estimation appear in Table 6 . 34 Our main results regarding the foreign dummy and the foreign ownership/bank size interaction also hold for Argentina and Chile using the two-step procedure. That is, in both the share and growth rate regressions for Chile, the foreign ownership dummy is negative and significant, while the foreign ownership/bank size interaction is positive and significant. For Argentina, that same pattern is evident in the growth rate regressions, but not in the share regressions. For Colombia and Peru, the foreign variables are insignificant. With so few observations, especially for Peru, it may be unrealistic to expect significant results.
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN SMALL BUSINESS LENDING ACROSS COUNTRIES: A PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION
Our empirical results suggest that large foreign banks are more inclined to lend to small businesses in Argentina and Chile than in Colombia and Peru. The growth rate regressions for Argentina and Chile show that large foreign banks increased their lending at faster rates than large domestic banks. In both countries, the large foreign banks had the highest estimated growth rates among all banks. In Chile, but not Argentina, large foreign banks devoted higher shares of their portfolios to small business lending than all banks but the smallest domestic ones. Although many explanations might be consistent with these results, we briefly explore three possible causal factors: the quality of the contracting environment, access to good information on borrowers, and the macroeconomic environment.
Contracting Environment
A good contracting environment serves to protect the rights of those entering into contracts. This type of protection is especially important in credit contracts, given the uncertainty regarding the future repayment capacity of borrowers. Table 7 compares the quality of the contracting environment in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, using four indices that capture somewhat different aspects of this environment. These indices, whose constructions and sources are described in detail in the Notes of Table 7 , have become standard tools in cross-country empirical 34. Banks that change ownership over the period are dropped from the second stage regressions, since it is impossible to define origin (i.e., foreign or domestic) for these banks in the second stage regression. Notes: Coefficients reported are those from the second stage of a two-step estimation to control for fixed effects in the share and growth of lending to small businesses. In the first stage, the share and growth of small business lending are regressed against all variables that change over time plus the fixed effects. In the second stage, the fixed effects are regressed on those variables that do not change over time (including size and foreign ownership). See Table 1 (5) indicating that private property is guaranteed by the government and that the court system can be used to enforce contracts and prevent confiscation and expropriation. In contrast, a score of (1) indicates that private property is either outlawed or the country is so chaotic or corrupt that property protection in nonexistent. Index from 1 to 4, from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI). Measures the "relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and the complications presented by language and mentality differences." Higher scores indicate greater enforceability. Values averaged over 1980-95. As reported in Knack and Keefer (1995) .
c Index from 1 to 6, from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes." Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, and strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power." Lower scores indicate "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims." Upon changes in government in countries scoring low on this measure, new leaders "may be less likely to accept the obligations of the previous regime." Values averaged over 1982-95. As reported in La Porta et al. (1997) .
d Index from 0 to 4, that aggregates several measures of creditor rights from La Porta et al. (1998) , Table 1 , with higher numbers representing greater protection. Index includes measures of protections for secured creditors, protections during reorganizations, and whether the debtor retains administration during reorganization.
e Galindo and Miller (2001) . Higher values represent more rigorous policies regarding collection of data and access to data. The index is an average of five indices indicating whether loans reported in the credit registries are described individually or presented in an aggregate way for individuals, whether registries provide both positive and negative information on borrowers or only negative information, the types of loans reported to the registries, the types of financial institutions that have access to the data, and the amount of information that the registry collects. studies of financial development and economic growth. For three of the indicesthe Index of Freedom measure of the security of property rights, BERI's measure of contract enforcement, and the ICRG measure of the Rule of Law-the rankings are almost identical. During our sample period, Chile finishes first, followed relatively closely by Argentina. Colombia and Peru finish third or fourth depending on the index. The gap between Argentina and Chile is typically much smaller than that between Argentina and either Colombia or Peru.
The remaining index, developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV), measures the strength of the legal rights afforded to creditors in the event of bankruptcy or firm reorganization. It summarizes the types of laws that are on the books rather than the quality of the enforcement of those laws. In that sense, the index differs from the other three, although, like the others, it indicates that during our sample period, laws in Chile and Argentina protected creditors better than in Colombia or Peru.
In short, on a number of indicators, Chile and Argentina appear to have provided better contracting environments than either Colombia or Peru, and this could partially explain why large foreign banks were more inclined to lend to small businesses in those countries during our period of study. These indices might also help resolve why both the share and the growth rate regressions indicated that large foreign banks in Chile were emphasizing small business lending, while only the growth rate regressions provided similar evidence for Argentina. As noted, Chile held a slight edge over Argentina on these indices, which suggests that they enjoyed an adequate contracting environment for a longer period. Large foreign banks in Chile may have had enough time to reach their equilibrium shares of lending to small business. In Argentina, an adequate contracting environment arrived later than in Chile, and thus large foreign banks probably had still not achieved equilibrium shares of small business lending by the end of the period.
Access to Good Borrower Information
Credit markets are generally characterized by asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers and adverse selection problems. These issues, which can result in credit rationing, are particularly pronounced in the small business loan market segment, given the opaque nature of these borrowers.
In Latin America, information problems can be especially pronounced because of economic volatility, poor accounting standards, and tax evasion (Galindo and Miller 2001) . In order to mitigate credit market failures associated with information problems, several countries in the region have established credit registries that collect borrower information over time. Galindo and Miller (2001) construct a ranking of credit registries in Latin America on the basis of the amount of information they contain, the type of information reported, the way it is reported, and who can access it (see Table 7 ). Among the four countries we focus on, Chile and Argentina (in that order) rank above Peru and Colombia. Argentina and Chile both have very strong private credit registries (now majority owned by Equifax). Also, these countries have public credit registries and, in the case of Argentina, much of these data are available to anyone via the internet.
Access to detailed borrower information in Chile and Argentina might explain why foreign banks in these countries seem better able to lend to small businesses. Good credit registries may allow foreign banks in these countries to overcome some of the informational disadvantages they might face in lending to traditionally opaque borrowers for whom they might lack the "soft" information that is acquired only after years of having a relationship with the debtor (a benefit that domestic banks might have). Instead, the information available from credit registries might enable foreign banks to exploit their comparative advantage at using more quantitative and standardized methods of granting credit to small businesses.
Macroeconomic Environment
Table 7 also provides average rates of inflation for each of the four countries over our sample period. Argentina and Chile both enjoyed lower inflation than either Colombia or Peru during this period. Because many small borrowers earn profits in local currency, price stability might have helped ameliorate one source of uncertainty and made it easier for large foreign banks to lend to small businesses. In short, it seems plausible that the contracting environment, access to good borrower information, and price stability all might have made it easier for large foreign banks in Argentina and Chile to lend to small businesses. However, further work is needed to confirm these suppositions.
CONCLUSIONS
As foreign participation increases in the banking sectors of developing countries, many questions remain unanswered. Key among them is whether foreign banks tend to shy away from lending to small businesses. Using bank-level data for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru over the mid-1990s, this paper examined the impact of bank origin on the share and growth rate of lending to small businesses, while controlling for other factors that might affect lending to this sector.
We find that, on average, foreign banks in Chile and Peru lent less to small businesses (as share of total lending) than private domestic banks (at least by end of period). In Argentina and Colombia, foreign and domestic banks lent similar shares to small business. The difference in the Chilean and Peruvian cases appears to be primarily due to the behavior of small foreign banks (i.e., foreign banks with a small local presence). In both cases, small foreign banks lent less to small businesses than small domestic banks. In contrast, the difference was considerably smaller for large-and medium-sized banks. In fact, after controlling for other factors that might affect lending, foreign banks with a large local presence actually appear to lend more to small businesses (as share of total lending) than large domestic banks in two of the four case study countries, Chile and Colombia. In all four countries, estimated growth rates for the largest foreign banks (based on assets of their local operations) are higher than for the largest domestic banks. The results from the specifications for Argentina and Chile are more reliable because both the foreign ownership dummy and the foreign ownership/size interaction term are significant.
In summary, we interpret our results as suggesting that among countries that allow foreign bank participation, small businesses are more likely to obtain credit from foreign banks when these have a significant local presence. This implies that countries that allow foreign bank participation and are concerned about bank lending to small businesses should pursue policies that encourage foreign banks to develop a significant local presence in the country. Though our paper has not directly explored what these policies might be, a cursory analysis of this issue suggests that good contracting environments, access to adequate borrower information, and policies that promote macroeconomic stability should be beneficial in this sense.
Whether foreign banks hamper access to credit by small businesses is a very important policy question for developing countries, since small firms account for large shares of value added and employment. However, the surge in foreign bank participation is fairly recent and as yet the data and empirical evidence are somewhat limited. While we believe our study makes a contribution by analyzing a more comprehensive dataset than existing studies and by exploring the relationship between bank origin, bank size, and small business lending, this paper is not without limitations. First, our study covers only four countries and is restricted to a relatively short sample period. Verifying the robustness of our results and disentangling the effects of foreign bank entry via mergers and acquisitions vis-à-vis de novo entry is likely to require longer time series. Second, our study cannot account for certain aspects of firm financing that might affect our statistics on the participation of foreign banks in lending to small businesses. For example, we do not have information on the percentage of large firms that are able to obtain bond or equity financing. If large firms demand less credit from banks, then foreign banks in certain countries might appear as lending more to small businesses relative to foreign banks in countries where large firms do not have access to equity or bond finance and have to rely on bank loans. Third, our numbers on the share and growth rate of foreign bank lending to small businesses do not take into account all possible types of foreign bank lending. In particular, our figures do not incorporate cross-border lending by foreign banks. Typically, this type of lending is provided to large firms or to governments, and consequently excluding them from the total lending provided by foreign banks will lead to an overestimation of the degree to which foreign banks lend to small businesses. Unfortunately, the existing numbers on cross-border lending to individual countries by foreign banks gathered by the Bank for International Settlements are aggregated at the country level and are not available by bank, as it would be required by this study. Furthermore, these numbers do not separate crossborder lending from local lending in foreign currency, which is included in our figures. To conclude, although our study is unlikely to be the final word on whether foreign banks discriminate against small businesses, our results provide useful preliminary evidence on this question, which we hope will stimulate further research on this important policy issue.
APPENDIX TABLE A1
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